毛泽东与管理艺术：一篇非毛化的幼稚之作

李北方按：12月15日西方的圣诞，26日则是毛泽东诞辰纪念日。这真的是一个巧合。前几天，毛泽东登上了英国《经济学人》的封面，被戴上了一顶红色的圣诞帽。该杂志配发了一篇文章，《毛泽东与管理艺术》。

我从《经济学人》的网站上，看到了这篇文章，看过之后，决定花一点时间翻译过来，让更多的人看到。把毛泽东和管理联系起来，并不新鲜了，满大街都是“跟毛泽东学管理”、“跟毛泽东学人际关系”之类的书，其他更乌七八糟的也多的是。出现什么都不会让人感到意外。恰好，两天前，和朋友一起聊天的时候，从史玉柱对毛泽东的崇拜和模仿，他也谈了很多毛泽东的管理方式也现代营销之间的关系。

但《经济学人》的这篇文章，真的算得上是极品之作了。该杂志被认为是严肃的、高质量的，我的一位经济学家朋友曾举例给我说明张五常在国际上的地位，例子就是《经济学人》引用过张的话。但《毛泽东与管理艺术》这篇文章呢，除了几句毛泽东自己论断，引证的来源只有一个，就是张戎和乔·哈利迪合著《毛泽东：鲜为人知的故事》。这是一本什么样的书，以及该书诬蔑毛泽东的初衷和动机，我在博客上转载过罗伯特·韦尔的书评《被敌人反对是好事而不是坏事》（http://linan2048.blog.sohu.com/70211771.html），已经说得很清楚了。为什么他们单单引用这本书，而不是其他更中肯、权威的著作呢？我想目的性是很明确的，大家都看得到，那就是对毛泽东进行鞭尸，进一步推动“非毛化”。

这是一篇拙劣的文章，背后流露着写作者的猥琐。即便我们以该文章对毛泽东的描述和定性为出发点开始讨论，那么又如何能得到它的结论呢？《经济学人》是一本鼓励职业经理人造假、虚伪、玩弄小花招的杂志吗？我想不是的，做如此市侩的姿态，无非是服务于其终极目的。

该文的作者显得像一个幼稚的小学生，他提出了一个他们自己都无法回避的问题：为什么他们把毛泽东描绘的那么坏那么不堪，在他的身后还有那么多人怀念他、爱戴他，甚至崇拜他。是的，这正是他们必须面对的问题。

毛泽东喜欢说的“反面教材”是什么，我以前还不懂，或者说理解得不够深刻。看了这样的文章，我明白了。当造谣者的姿态过于卑劣的时候，他们也就本相毕露了，那些曾经被他们欺骗的人，也会开始反思，进而抛弃他们。说实在的，我个人的反思和转变就是由此开始的。老田先生说，他研究文革的兴趣的就是从知识精英们对文革的妖魔化开始的，这些个精英都堕落至此了，还如此起劲地否定文革，想必其中有蹊跷。郭松民兄说，茅于轼就像是“曹营的蒋干”，跳得越欢，人民对他们的认识也就越彻底。是的，让他们尽情跳跃吧，是好事，真的。借用这篇文章的话：We all know what we are in the long run.

对毛泽东的诬蔑，是人类历史上的第一大冤案，望他老人家的在天之灵安息。在毛泽东诞辰114周年之际，我花了一点时间把这篇“反面教材”翻译出来，以此为纪念。

翻译，是为了方便不熟悉英文的朋友阅读。另外，也是听朋友说，《经济学人》的语言优雅且难读，一般的英国人看着都费劲的。我的英文并不好，所以把原文附在后面，如果有理解错误，请朋友们指出。更多的相关问题，请参阅韦尔教授的书评，他已经说得很清楚了，而且是我所远远不及的，这里就不重复了。

译文：

毛泽东与管理艺术

管理类书籍倾向于用最宽泛的词语来定义成功——伟大的产品、愉悦的雇员、持续不断的进步、大把的利润、被打垮的竞争对手。即便“卓越”和“成功”这种词在标题中被省去，这些也是被暗示的。一个恰当的例子是阿尔弗雷德·斯隆于1963年出版的《我和通用汽车在一起的日子》——很多人认为这本书定义了这一类别（管理类图书）——当时通用汽车还是个标志性的公司，斯隆被正确地评为这家运转良好、分散化的国际大公司的建筑师。

但把目光限于最优如何生产出最优有其局限。毕竟大多数经理人不能像斯隆那样，从一个巨大的废旧汽车堆积场上获得成功。他们不能取悦客户、击溃对手和创造巨额财富。他们勉强过活。他们步履蹒跚。

适合他们的书在哪里？谁能帮助那些表现不佳、付出透支的首席执行官们对付烦人的记者、独立董事和那些可以做得更好的野心勃勃的副总？最需要榜样的经理人——他用任何对业绩的客观衡量手段都不能，也不可能进行管理——的榜样在哪里？

一个明显的人选是毛。是的，他是一个国家的领导人，而不是一个公司的。但他自觉地使用了一个有商业色彩的头衔，主席（chairman），在从1949年到1976年——这一年他死在任上，管理中国时，他把一连串可能的替代者投入监狱、杀掉或在心理上打垮，从而创造出了那个经典的商业问题：继承人缺位。用他自己的话，他认为自己是一个“不知疲倦的导师”，以他的演讲节录而成的著名的“红宝书”充满了如何训练、激励和考评低层雇员（基层骨干）的管理学建议：创新（百花齐放）、竞争（不怕牺牲）、当然还提出了那些自命不凡的管理者们的游戏（无情的自我批评）。

即便在死亡使他那只令人窒息的手松开之后，中国经济立即便开始了蓬勃发展，但毛至少对中国经济还有符号意义上的控制。他的肖像被印在中国的货币上，书包上，T恤上，胸章上，手表上和数不清的资本家们——在当权时，毛把他们踩在脚下——可以出售的一切东西上。没有任何一个近代国家领导人（北朝鲜除外）这样被尊重，甚至那些做得不错的领导人。

为毛赢得了这样的奉承的，并不是有价值的管理风格。根据张戎和乔·哈利迪合著《毛泽东：鲜为人知的故事》——诚然是一个对毛毫无同情的刻画，他“要为7000万人的死负责，远超过20世纪的任何领导人”。但为什么要停留在20世纪呢？在中国历史上，只有开始修建长城（据说每块砖的代价都是一条命）的秦始皇可以与之匹敌。因为那时的人口要少得多，毛可能在（致人死亡的）绝对数字上超过了秦始皇。

拙劣的经济政策导致了惨剧的绝大部分。毛的继承者邓小平扭转了政策，最终改善了经济。但他甚至没在硬币上留下一个头像。

毛的表现和他的声誉之间的不对称是有教育意义的，背后有四个关键点，所有蹩脚的经理人都可以有效地使用。

一个有力的、虚假的口号

出身为一个中等富裕程度的村民，毛过着皇帝那样的生活，被农民用轿子抬着，被情妇环绕，被每个人捧着。但他最著名的口号是“为人民服务”。这个自相矛盾显示出他聪明的一面：他证明自己行为合理的能力，无论多么彻底的为自己，却能说成为别人。

心理学家称之为“认知上的不一致”——在做一件事时制造出对另一件事的引入关注、动人心魄的效果的能力。能够实现这种伎俩在很多行业中都是个基本的技能。它能使不合格的首席执行官在下属只有花生（或大米）拿的时候，能够把自己的巨额收入合理化。

但顺从的董事会没有对毛尥蹶子，雇员们也没向毛翻白眼。他让他的国人信服他的价值观。这部分是因为，即便他传递的信息与他的行为毫无关系，但它精准而简练地表达了他应该做的事情。思考一下“为人民服务”的本质和清晰程度，再与一般公司的理念表述进行对比，后者充满了与股东和企业社会责任相关的一堆字眼和实现，雇员们几乎读不出来，更不要说记住了。

邓小平在复苏经济的过程中使用的口号，有类似的特点。“实事求是”是一个斯隆会喜欢、每个经理人都应该珍视的用语，但你不会看到它被刻在中国的任何一面墙上。它不带有毛式的虚伪的理想主义，也没有被极力推广。

无情的媒体操控

毛不仅懂得如何找到关键点，而且知道怎么把它传播出去。通过大字报、“红宝书”和再教育循环，他的信息持续地强化。“笤帚不到”，他说，“灰尘不会自己跑掉。”这个自我扩张的过程通常被作为“个人崇拜”来对待，但很难把它和建立品牌价值的现代商业行为区分开。

然而在中国，经济增长是乏力的，生活条件是悲惨的。那么为什么一大批西方的政治、军事和学界领袖接受毛品牌的价值呢？甚至斯大林，一个毫无正直可言的观察者，相信毛，并保护了毛——虽然后来后悔了。该品牌建设的教训是，一个清晰的、乌托邦式的信息，以极端的方式不断重复，可以模糊掉事实。伟大的推销员天生就懂得这个道理。那些战略执行不利的管理人员需要学习它。

首席执行官们不能像毛那样压制媒体。但无论如何，他对媒体的操纵提供了一些借鉴。他只对阿谀奉承的记者谈话，他在西方的吸引力主要来自这些记者写的圣徒传，这些记者的职业建立在与他的联系渠道之上。

法律限制了现代的首席执行官们效仿毛的公共策略的能力。上市公司不得不发布信息，而不是有选择地对外披露。但很多公司在限制范围内模仿毛的媒体管理，其他控制信息的公司被停牌了。挖掘那些对商业和政治领袖赞美的新闻标题，很明显，这个策略起在作用。

朋友和同事的牺牲

 “谁是我们的朋友？谁是我们的敌人？这是首要的问题。”毛写道。斯隆对此是同意的。他担忧偏袒会以管理中最有价值的因素——对表现的客观评价——作为代价。

毛有不同的目标：他不愿别人离他太近，进而接近权力。所以当毛的朋友通常被证明比当他的敌人更危险。一次清洗接着另一次清洗。提拔和贬职被狂热地操控。给出大把的激励，然后再收回。有些贬职被证明是积极的，邓小平在拖拉机厂的流放可能帮助他了解了商业，因而重建了经济，但这是不无意间的好处。

这种研究是有意义的。亲密的同事可能要你的位子，他们之间的关心可能让你分心。毛对朋友的抛弃，甚至对妻子和孩子的抛弃看起来像是建立在计算之上：哪个投资值得保留，哪个应当被视为沉没成本。过去的帮助不会得到回报。据张戎和乔·哈利迪，一个救过他的命的大夫在被错误的指控为不忠后，被扔在监狱里死去。毛任由这种事发生：他那时已经有其他的医生了。

相反，敌人可能是有用的。毛经常将战场上的损失推到竞争对手的头上，让他们为损失承担责任。这种伎俩的现代受害者的名字可以在投行被解雇的名单上看到，干这些事的人是他们的领导或顶替了他们位置的人。

有行动代替成绩

毛喜欢避开沉闷的或让人不快的会议，尤其是当他不想被批评的时候。但这可能帮助他避免陷入困境。从1950年代晚期的反右到大跃进，从1960年代早起失败的工业和农业试验到1960年代后期的文化大革命，毛从不缺少计划。

在毛的领导下，中国没有随波逐流，她像脱缰的野马。推动力来自最上面。政策是贫乏的，执行是糟糕的，领导行为偏离了方向，但每一个念头看起来都创造出了向心力，每个人都望着北京，想知道如何向前走（或避免被踩踏）。在商业中，类同的行为是进行重组，越广泛越好。也许对挣扎着的经理人而言，这是最重要的一课：如果你不能做对的事情，那么就多做。你在做的事情越多，灾难性的结果显现出来得就越慢。要敢想：以他所有的缺点而言，毛的确是有启发性的。

当然，最终事实会证明你是个什么人。但谁在乎呢？我们最终都会知道我们是谁。

附原文：

Mao and the art of management

Dec 19th 2007

A role model, of sorts

Books on management tend to define success in the broadest possible terms—great product, happy employees, continuous improvement, gobs of profits, crushed competitors. Even when words such as “excellence” and “success” are omitted from the title, they are often implicit. A case in point is the book which many would say defined the genre, Alfred Sloan"s “My Years with General Motors”, published in 1963 when GM was still an iconic company and Sloan correctly acknowledged as the architect of the well-run, decentralised, global corporation.

But focusing on how the best produce the best has its limits. Most managers, after all, do not stitch an industrial triumph from a vast bankrupt junkyard, as Sloan did. They do not delight their customer, crush competitors and create vast wealth. They struggle. They stumble.

Where is the book for them? Who can help the under-performing, over-compensated chief executive fighting to survive intrusive journalists, independent shareholders and ambitious vice-presidents who could do a better job? Where is the role model for the manager who really needs a role model most—the one who by any objective measure of performance cannot, and should not, manage at all?

An obvious candidate is Mao. Yes, he was head of a country, not a company. But he self-consciously carried a business-like title, “chairman”, while running China from 1949 until dying in office in 1976, having jailed, killed, or psychologically crushed a succession of likely replacements and therefore created the classic business problem: a succession void. He thought of himself as, in his own words, an “indefatigable teacher” and the famous “Little Red Book” drawn from his speeches is packed with managerial advice on training, motivation and evaluation of lower-level employees (cadres); innovation (“let a hundred flowers bloom”); competition (“fear no sacrifice”); and, of course, raising the game of the complacent manager (relentless self-criticism).

Mao still has at least a symbolic hold over the Chinese economy, even though it began to blossom only after death removed his suffocating hand. His portrait is emblazoned on China"s currency, on bags, shirts, pins, watches and whatever else can be sold by the innumerable entrepreneurial capitalists that he ground beneath his heel when in power. No other recent leader of a viable country (outside North Korea, in other words) is so honoured—not even ones that did a good job.

It was not a nurturing management style that won Mao this adulation. According to Jung Chang"s and Jon Halliday"s “Mao, the Unknown Story”, admittedly an unsympathetic portrait, he was responsible for “70m deaths, more than any other 20th-century leader”. But why stop at the 20th century? In Chinese history, only Emperor Qin Shi Huang, who started building the Great Wall (in which each brick is said to have cost a life), was competition for Mao; and since the population was much smaller then, Mao is likely to have outdone him in absolute numbers.

Botched economic policies caused most of the carnage. Deng Xiaoping, Mao"s successor, turned the policies, and eventually the economy, around. Yet he does not even merit an image on a coin.

The disparity between Mao"s performance and his reputation is instructive, for behind it are four key ingredients which all bad managers could profitably employ.

• A powerful, mendacious slogan

Born a modestly well-off villager, Mao lived like an emperor, carried on litters by peasants, surrounded by concubines and placated by everyone. Yet his most famous slogan was “Serve the People”. This paradox illustrates one aspect of his brilliance: his ability to justify his actions, no matter how entirely self-serving, as being done for others.

Psychologists call this “cognitive dissonance”—the ability to make a compelling, heartfelt case for one thing while doing another. Being able to pull off this sort of trick is an essential skill in many professions. It allows sub-standard chief executives to rationalise huge pay packages while their underlings get peanuts (or rice).

But Mao did not just get a stamp from a compliant board and eye-rolling from employees. He convinced his countrymen of his value. That was partly because, even if his message bore no relation to his actions, it expressed precisely and succinctly what he should have been doing. Consider the truth and clarity of “serve the people” compared with the average company"s mission statement, packed with a muddle of words and thoughts tied to stakeholders and CSR, that employees can barely read, let alone memorise.

Deng Xiaoping"s slogan, which he used in his campaign to revive the economy, had similar virtues. “Truth from facts” is a sound-bite that Sloan would have loved and every manager should cherish, but you won"t find it chiselled on a Chinese wall. It doesn"t have the hypocritical idealism of Mao"s version—nor was it pushed so hard.

• Ruthless media manipulation

Mao knew not just how to make a point but also how to get it out. Through posters, the “Little Red Book” and re-education circles, his message was constantly reinforced. “Where the broom does not reach”, he said, “the dust will not vanish of itself.” This process of self-aggrandisement is often dismissed as a “personality cult”, but is hard to distinguish from the modern business practice of building brand value.

Yet within China economic growth was pathetic and living conditions were wretched. So why did a vast list of Western political, military and academic leaders accept the value of Mao"s brand at his own estimation? Even Stalin, no guileless observer, believed in and, to his later regret, protected Mao. The brand-building lesson is that a clear, utopian message, hammered home relentlessly, can obscure inconvenient facts. Great salesmen are born knowing this. Executives whose strategies are not delivering need to learn it.

Chief executives are not in a position to crush the media as Mao did. Nevertheless, his handling of them offers some lessons. He talked only to sycophantic journalists and his appeal in the West came mainly from hagiographies written by reporters whose careers were built on the access they had to him.

The law constrains the modern chief executive"s ability to imitate Mao"s PR strategy. Publicly listed companies have to publish information, rather than hand it out selectively. But many, within bounds, emulate Mao"s media management; others, determined to control information about them, are delisting. Burrow beneath laudatory headlines on business and political leaders, and it becomes clear that the strategy works.

• Sacrifice of friends and colleagues

“Who are our friends? Who are our enemies? This is a question of first importance,” Mao wrote. Sloan agreed. He worried that favouritism would come at the expense of the single most valuable component of management: the objective evaluation of performance.

Mao had a different goal: he did not want people too close to him, and therefore to power; so being Mao"s friend often proved more dangerous than being his enemy. One purge followed another. Promotions and demotions were zealously monitored. Bundles of incentives were given and withdrawn. Some demotions turned out well. Deng Xiaoping"s exile in a tractor factory may have helped him understand business, and thus rebuild the economy, but that was an unintended benefit.

This approach makes sense. Close colleagues may want your job, and relationships with them may distract you. Mao"s abandonment of friends and even wives and children seemed to be based on a calculation of which investments were worth maintaining and which should be regarded as sunk costs. Past favours were not returned. According to Ms Chang and Mr Halliday, a doctor who saved his life was left to die on a prison floor after being falsely accused of disloyalty. Mao let it happen: he had other doctors by then.

Enemies, conversely, can be useful. Mao often blamed battlefield losses on rivals who were made to suffer for these defeats. The names of modern victims of this tactic will be visible on the list of people sacked at an investment bank after a rough quarter; the practitioners are their superiors, or those who have taken their jobs.

• Activity substituting for achievement

Mao was quite willing to avoid tedious or uncomfortable meetings, particularly when he was likely to be criticised. But maybe that helped him avoid getting bogged down. From the Anti-Rightist Movement of the late 1950s to the Great Leap Forward, a failed agricultural and industrial experiment in the early 1960s, to the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s, Mao was never short of a plan.

Under Mao, China didn"t drift, it careened. The propellant came from the top. Policies were poor, execution dreadful and leadership misdirected, but each initiative seemed to create a centripetal force, as everyone looked toward Beijing to see how to march forward (or avoid being trampled). The business equivalent of this is restructuring, the broader the better. Perhaps for the struggling executive, this is the single most important lesson: if you can"t do anything right, do a lot. The more you have going on, the longer it will take for its disastrous consequences to become clear. And think very big: for all his flaws, Mao was inspiring.

In the long run, of course, the facts will find you out. But who cares? We all know what we are in the long run.