史华兹教授名著中译本导言译文商榷

   － － 兼介史教授治史心法                

龚忠武

目录

一、前言

二、商榷：曲译、略译、漏译、误译

三、史教授治史心法

注释

附录：序文原文（便于读者查阅对照）

一、            前言

去年12月23日在乌有之乡网站的「读书交流」版上看到我的业师史华兹教授（Benjamin Isadore Schwartz,1916－1999）（1）的成名作Chinese Commun-ism and the Rise of Mao Zedong中译本的导言，颇感亲切。这本书同我的另一位业师费正清教授（1907－1991）的成名作，《中国沿海的贸易与外交，1842——1854年通商口岸的开埠》（Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854），都堪称是哈佛大学和一般美国大学中国近代史的经典教本，也是哈佛学派的代表作，我们每个学生都得熟读、精读。所以就禁不住好奇地将译文同原文对照了一下，当然是抱着一种佳作共赏的心情去拜读，而不是吹毛求疵地要刻意地去专挑毛病。

不对照不知道，一对照吓了一跳，看到了一大堆问题，出了一些不该出的问题，例如在短短的5个中文页中就发现了多处的曲译、略译、漏译，甚至是严重的误解误译。译文中语焉不详，词不达意之处，也是随处可见。这些不该发生的问题使得译文无法将原著真实、明畅通达地传达给读者。因此，作为他的学生，觉得实在有话要说，不吐不快。这就是写本文的动机。（2）

我要说的话，可以分为下列两大方面，一个是对译文的商榷，主要是同译者就翻译谈翻译；一个是简介史教授的治史心法，希望同专业的史学同行和业余的史学同好交流，因为这也同真实地传达他的思想、观点、立场，有密切的关系。不过，必须指出，史教授著作等身，思想缜密深奥，所以这里主要只是单就序言而论，当然也连带地会有所阐发。

二、            商榷：曲译、略译、漏译、误译

当将他国文字译成本国文字时，一般的要求就是严复在翻译《天演论》(Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays )的序言中提出的「信、达、雅」三条标准。信者即译文要力求忠于原文，不要漏译、曲译、略译，尤其不能误译；达者即译文要力求通顺明达，易读易懂；雅者即译文要力求典雅优美。也可以简单地概括为译文要力求准确、顺畅、优美。（3）这就是我评论史著译文所根据的标准。

按照这三大标准，史著序言的译文中确有不少值得商榷之处。但因为史著是思想史，不是文学史，所以本文只讨论信、达两个方面，雅则略而不论。

先说信吧，以下所举的是关于曲译、漏译、略译的例子：

（一）曲译

1、译文第1和第4等段中，将tension（s）译为矛盾冲突，不能说错，

因为tension（s）中是有矛盾冲突的意思，但作者为什么不使用英文中本就有的contradictions and conflicts，而使用tensions呢？答案是tensions是自由主义者的术语，contradictions and conflicts是马克思主义者的术语，将tensions等同于contradictions and conflicts，是曲译了作者自由主义的学术立场。所以建议还是应该译为「紧张状态」为妥。

2、译文第2段中，将historic abstraction译为「历史哲学」，也不能说是误译，但却不是作者的原意。大家都知道，历史哲学的英文是philosophy of history, 为什么作者却偏偏要使用historic abstraction，而不使用philosophy of history，因为作者作为保守的自由主义思想史家，一向对于实证主义、社会科学、历史哲学采取消极的排拒态度。所以historic abstraction还是应按照字典的意思译为历史的概念化或抽象化，或抽象的历史概念，不应译为历史哲学，否则就译过头了，偏离作者的原意了。

不过，英文原句是dwell on the presumably Olympian heights of

sociological, economic, geopolitical, and historic abstraction

原译是：对于那些谈论社会学的、经济学的、地缘政治学的、历史哲学的假想的奥林匹亚顶峰的人来说。建议改译如下：对于哪些老是站在社会学、经济学、地缘政治学和历史学的抽象概念所设想的奥林匹亚制高点上的人来说。

3、第3段译文中，将learn译为「学会」，也不能说错，因为这是字典中的第一个意思。但除了有学习、学会的意思之外，还有别的意思，就是「知道、认识到、得知、了解、理解到等」等意思。从本文的上下文来推敲，这里的learn应该理解为「知道、认识到、得知、了解、理解到」更为贴切，因为这是「研究之後」的必然结果。learn 这个字在英语世界的一般日常对话中是经常会听到的，例如人们常说  I learn that……（我听说，我得知……，不是我「学会了」的意思）。

这三个是曲译的例子，就是译者硬是按照自己的理解，将原文曲译成自己所理解的意思了，不是作者的原意。至于将learn译为「学会」，可能还涉及到译者不清楚美国人的日常习惯用语，是不小心地误译了。

(二) 原文被略而不译的部分，现试为补译如下：

1、译文第17段中，将 its self-chosen high priests in Kremlin略而

不译，也可算作漏译。现补译为「自命的（或自封的）克里姆林宫的理论权威」。译者略而不译的原因可能是由于英文的high priests这种宗教性特强的字眼有可能会让读者联想到将马列主义比作宗教因而带有贬义吧？但是如果译为「理论权威」，不是就没有贬义了吗？而这个意思也是在英汉字典中可以找到的。

2、原文中被略掉的第9段，现补译如下：

当将这种普遍的概念用于审视中国共产主义运动时，目前的中国共产主义领导人无疑地是因为他们满足了中国亿万农民的迫切需要才能掌握权力。然而，如果因此就跳到结论说，他们是中国人民愿望的化身，他们仍然将会自动地代表群众的需要和愿望，那就会编造一个神话，从而就会事先认可中国共产主义领导人今后的一切活动都是对的。群众的需求是会随着时间而变的，列宁在宣告国家与和平的誓言时，他也许是完全满足了群众的迫切需求，但是后来他在克隆斯塔Kronstadt起义(4)时，难道也是同群众的迫切需求保持一致吗？

这段之所以被译者略而不译显然也是基于政治原因，因为在译者看来，列宁怎么可能违反群众的意愿，甚至走到了要镇压群众的地步呢？这是正统的马列主义者不能接受的。所以就干脆删掉了，这样最保险。但是，这却是作者作为一个反对马克思主义的自由主义者的真正想法，经过译者这麽一删，如何能如实地传达作者真正的学术立场呢？

（三）更有甚者是序文的误读误解误译，下面的两个例子是绝对的误读、误解、误译：

1、译文第3段中，将inherit译为「实现」，而inherit这个字的意思是承袭、继承、接过、接班等，压根就没有「实现」的意思。如果不对照原文，译文也完全可以读得通。但原文用了inherit是有深意的，是说中共承袭了或接过了革命前辈的历史的棒子，也即历史任务(historical tasks)，说成历史责任也可。这个责任在毛崛起之前根本谈不上实现，所以英文原文使用inherit而不使用realize是经过考虑的，是有深意的。

2、译文第18段也即最后一段中，将paralytic译为「是没有影响的」，意思同原文正好相反。Paralytic 的意思是麻木、麻痹，原文的意思是说「这种形象对那些反对克里姆林宫的人来说产生麻痹作用」，结果译文却译为「是没有影响的」，同原意正好相反，显然是误解误译了。

最後再说达，下面也将列举一些有代表性的例子以资说明。

1、第2段最后一句中，将so much froth on the surface of reality译为「似乎是过于空谈事实的表面」，既不达也不雅，建议改译如下：「似乎尽是些夸夸其谈的表面文章」。

同一句中，将so much small talk 译为「过于小的话题」，因此the details of political relations may seem to be so much small talk not worth of the scholars整句就译为「他们之间政治关系的细节似乎是不值得研究的过于小的话题」。建议改译如下：他们之间政治关系的细节（或来龙去脉）似乎尽是些不值得学者深究的茶余饭后的闲谈（谈资）。

2、译文第3段中，将sheer folly译为「愚蠢之极」，建议改译为：愚不可及。有现成的成语为什么不用？

3、译文第5段中，将accept at face value ideological pronounce－ments译为「接受意识形态主张的表面」，建议改译为：接受纯为意识形态主张的表面文章；同一句中，将simply empty ritual phrases译为「完全是空洞的形式语言」，建议改译为：空洞的陈腔滥调。

4、译文第8段中，将involved in a common situation with the masses译为「他们在通常情况下与民众相关联」，意思是到位了，但直译的英文味太重，建议改译为「与群众命运与共」。为什么有现成的中文成语不用？

5、译文第10段中，将 the atmosphere in which the Chinese Communist leaders live and the air in which they breathe译为「共产党领导人生活的环境、呼吸的空气」。又犯了过于直译的毛病，英文味太重，建议改译为「中国共产党领导人俯仰生息的大环境（或大气候）」。

6、译文第12段中，将dead verbiage译为「过时的赘词」，听起来怪怪的，何不干脆译为「废话」。

7、译文第17段中，将Stalin’s own prescience and masterly planning 译为「斯大林的自我预知和巧妙计划」，译文太欠缺想象力了，太俗气了，建议改译为「斯大林的神机妙算」，既简洁又传神，更能传达作者的原意。

8、第18段中将discourage belief译为「不相信」，就英文本身的意思来说，也不能说是全错。这句的原译文是：「不相信它（这种形象）能够在一个仍然充满不可预知的偶然事件的世界里派上用场」，我认为译文没有让人看懂作者到底要说什么。怪不得有位读者投书说，他不明白「该文的作者想干什么? 而且,此篇文章废话满篇,有关正题却言之草草,且似乎没有结尾!」用通俗的话说，就是「不知所云」。所以，他抱怨编者竟然推荐这样一篇阐述马克思主义理论的文章。这位网友的牢骚，可能是由于译文低劣造成的，当然也可能是他根本就是个中国近代史的「外行」，看不懂「内行」史教授学院派的语境和玄虚的门道。

为了达，建议采取意译法，改译如下：「这种超人的社会工程师形象让人不会去相信，在一个仍然充满不可预知的偶然事件（变数）的世界里，竟然可以抗拒这种形象，不听他那一套，进而反其道而行之，主宰自己的命运。」

为了更能够准确地传达原文中隐含的意思，而且让人一看就懂，改译的译文中不得不添加了些字，不但没有改变作者的原意，而是更清楚地传达了作者的原意。这就是达。

三、史华兹教授的治史心法

首先是决定史华兹教授治学方向和立场的基本信念，就是他坚信人的自由意

志free will，由此衍生他维护、珍视个人自由的绝对价值，和反对社会主义、共产主义的理念和社会制度。他的老师费正清，当然也是个自由主义者，但是两人的不同点在于，一个是纯学者，一个是游走于政学之间；也就是说，前者只做学问，不问政治，而后者既是位学者，又是一位以美国爱国主义者自豪的公众人物。在治中国史学上，一个专精思想史，一个专精制度史和外交史，相得益彰，长期以来成为哈佛学派的两大支柱重镇，在美国中国学界叱咤风云。

在奉守自由意志的这种强烈信念之下，史华兹教授的治学或治史心法可以归纳为几条简单的守则：一是历史是人的自由意志的体现，没有什么规律可言，当然也就不可以预测；二是个人是历史的载体，群体是无数的具有自由意志的个人组成的，特别是历史上的大人物如毛泽东具有左右历史走向的作用；三是体现自由意志的欧美社会是人类历史的正道，体现集体意志的社会主义、共产主义是人类历史的邪道。四是中国人和中国文明有其独特性，必然会走自己的道路，不会听从别人来指手划脚。

费正清当然也是奉行的自由主义，除了以上四条之外，还要加上一条，那就是从人类文明和人类历史的高度，将欧美的高度文明向亚非的低度文明传播是白人不容推卸的天赋使命。当然，史华兹不会有意识地相信这种历史宿命论。不过，当将这些信念和信条应用到中国共产主义运动的学术研究时，两人所得的两个先验性结论是一样的，就是：一是中国共产主义虽然目前成功了，还会存在一段时间，但其最终命运是不可知的，而且其前途注定是多灾多难的；二是中共同苏共同床异梦，分道扬镳只是时间问题，不是会不会的问题。（5）

这四点，既是心法，就可以尽量简化，可以仿效中国古代帝王相传的「人心惟危，道心惟微。惟精惟一，允执厥中」的16字心法（见《尚书--大禹谟》），将史华兹教授的治学心法也压缩成16个字，即「人心第一，个人至上，中苏异质，分道扬镳」。这16个字大概可以概括他的全部有关中国共产主义运动和毛泽东思想的著作。他在冷战时期，早就预言中苏共同床异梦，迟早必然分家，後来果然不幸而言中，以致令行内学者专家赞佩其远见和深刻的洞察力。

以上只是对史华兹教授治史的心法的简要概括，当然也可能是仁智互见，而有不同看法，但基本上应该没有多大差别。再顺便介绍一些足以体现他谦逊包容的学者大家风范的口头禅。这些口头禅散见于他的著作中，并且在史教授讲课和讨论时，也常常挂在他的嘴边：

1、well, ……，but I think…… 就算是吧，不过我认为……（肯定对话者的意见，但他也有话说）

2、on the one hand, and on the other

一方面是……, 但是另一方面……（注意事物正反的两个方面，或事物的复杂性、多面性）

3、as it were(so to speak),可以说。（他从不武断专断，总是让探讨留有阐发的余地空间）

 4、very intriguing 很有意思。（对于学生提出同他不同的看法，他从不直接反驳，而是委婉地正面鼓励学生发表自己的看法。我记得在课堂上或在讨论我的论文时，对他提出了一些不同的看法，他总是爱用这个字来鼓励我。）

5、nuance细微差异，他在课堂上，也常常提醒学生不要大而化之，要注意事情之间的细微差异。

6、sympathetic understanding 同情或移情地理解你要处理的历史人物。（费正清特别重视这点，在指导学生论文时，他特别提醒学生要深入历史人物的内心世界，将自己投射到历史人物的主观和客观世界。只有这样，你才能如实地描述这个历史人物。这就同演电影一样，当你扮演一个角色时，你必须进入这个角色，才能把这个角色演活，写论文也是同样的道理。所以，有一次例行拜访他请教有关写论文的问题时，他要我尽量将自己比作张之洞，从张的处境设身处地的想张为什么哪样做，哪样想。当然，这也是史教授的心法。）

以上所述都足以显示他虽然已经是一位公认的大学者，国际级的学术权威，但是他从来没有盛气凌人，以致让学生或同事敬而远之，总是谦逊和蔼，让人如坐春风，觉得同他对话是一种乐趣，一种智性的享受。

虽然他对日常生活上的细节非常马虎，时常忘东忘西（例如他有时竟会忘掉你同他的约会时间），很有中国名士的风范，但是私下或课堂上，每当他提到毛主席时，总是很有礼貌地、一本正经地称呼Chairman Mao( 毛主席)，从来没有听他只说Mao。 费正清也是如此，他们师生虽然坚决反共，但在学术与政治之间还是保持应有的分际，应有的礼仪风范，不像一些在哈佛任教的中国教授，总是很粗鲁地直呼「老毛……如何，如何」。

另外值得一提的是他在讲课或写书时，常常爱用一些标志自由主义信念和立场的术语或套语。这在他的序文中可以证明，例如他作为一个典型的自由主义者，很不喜欢马克思主义的矛盾概念，所以他们就用tensions紧张状态，juxta－position并立对举，polarization两极化（6），paradoxical吊诡来表述这个概念。我的博士论文是写张之洞的，当写到张的《劝学篇》时，我认为内篇和外篇是一种儒家的辩证关系。他说他反对这种提法，而是一种对举关系，不存在着内在的矛盾。後来我看到国内的哲学家庞朴写了一本《儒家辩证法研究》（中华书局，1984年），我才肯定我的这种提法是成立的。他在审查我的论文时，并没有为此刁难，强迫我接受他的看法，而是让我顺利过关。

他也不喜欢规律这样的概念，所以他们就用generalization普遍化，abstraction抽象, pattern模式等概念来代替，尽量避免使用反映马列主义历史决定论的术语、套语、概念等。

我之所以不厌其烦举了这麽多的例子，目的是在说明史教授作为自由主义大师所体现的风范、思想风格，这些都反映在他的著作中，当然也反映在他的序言中。序言的译者，当然对史教授不是那么了解，所以他在翻译序言时出了上述的一些大大小小的问题，也是可以想象的，也是情有可愿的，当然其中严重的误读、误解、误译的部分另当别论。

注释：

1、一般美国的中国问题专家都爱起个中文名字，例如费正清的名字就是1930年代他在清华做研究时蒋廷黻替他起的。但史华兹没有从俗，没有确定的中文名字，所以他的中译名就因人而异，有好几个，例如施华茨等。本文因为是对中译本译文的商榷，所以就采用了该书的译名，史华兹。

史华兹教授1916年出生于麻州波斯顿的一个犹太家庭,中学就读于座落在哈佛校园区内的著名的拉丁中学（Boston Latin High School），1938年在哈佛以优异的成绩毕业，专攻罗曼语。二战时在情报部门服了四年兵役（1942－46），学了日文，破译日文电码。战后回到哈佛研究院，成为费正清的大弟子，专攻中国的语文、历史和政治，毕业後一直在哈佛任教，直至去世为止。1975至1987年退休其间，担任哈佛历史学和政治学的威廉斯讲座教授（Leroy B. Williams Chair in History and Political Science）。1979年被选为亚洲学会会长，1997年也即去世前两年，美国历史学会授予学术成就奖，肯定他对中国研究的卓越贡献。

在哈佛的中国研究，费正清专攻制度史和外交关系史，史华兹则专攻思想史，（history of ideas 或intellectual history）,是美国著名大学中关于中国研究的绝佳分工，在美国的中国研究领域中独领风骚数十年。

使史华兹一举成名的著作，就是《中国的共产主义与毛泽东的崛起》

（Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao）。这是在他的博士论文的基础上扩大改写的。在他研究和该书出版的这段其间，正值朝鲜战争和麦卡斯主义时期，中国学和毛主义正是当红的显学，要求学界特别是美国的中国问题专家研究中国共产主义和毛主义的性质和检讨美国「为何失掉中国（loss of China）？」史华兹的著作正是对这两个问题提出了理性的、深刻的、权威性的答案。该书的结论是，毛所代表的中国共产主义有着鲜明的不同于莫斯科共产主义的中国特色，带有强烈的中国民族主义色彩，所以既是一本思想史，也是一本政治史，奠定了他成为西方中国共产主义的历史和理论的权威地位，特别是毛主义的权威地位。

还值得一提和推荐的是他的另外两本名著，《追求富国强兵》（In Search of Wealth and Power ） （严复研究）和《古代中国的思想世界》（The World of Thought in Ancient China），前者从严复的角度比较了中西的自由主义传统，后者从中国古代思想史的角度比较了中国古代思想和其他几个古老文明的思想。这两本书奠定了他作为国际上中国思想史大家或宗师的地位。

（2）这里只限于导言部分，至于全书的译文则无缘拜读。

（3）在严复之前，曾任李鸿章翻译的马建忠（1845－1900），1894年在他的《拟设翻译书院议》一书中写道：「夫译之为事难矣，译之将奈何？其平日冥心钩考，必先将所译者与所以译者两国之文字深嗜笃好，字栉句比，以考彼此文字孳生之源，同异之故，所有相当之实义，委曲推究，务审其音声之高下，析其字句之繁简，尽其文体之变态，及其义理粗深奥折之所由然。夫如是，则一书到手，经营反复，确知其意旨之所在，而又摹写其神情，仿佛其语气，然后心悟神解，振笔而书，译成之文，适如其所译而止，而曾无毫发出入于其间，夫而后能使阅者所得之益，与观原文无异，是则为善译也已。」

马氏对翻译的说明和要求可以同严复的，一并参考玩味。特别是马氏认为好

的译文应该要做到「译成之文适如其所译而止，而曾无毫发出入于其间，夫而后能使阅者所得之益与观原文无异」，实在是翻译的最高境界，切中翻译精要。于此可见，译事之难，要成为马氏所谓的「善译者」更是难上加难。

(4) 1917年俄国革命其间旧的国家体制瓦解崩离，社会陷于无政府状态，群众各行所是，不听约束；群众之激进，有时甚至超过布尔什维克之意料。在这种情形之下，环境所需要的不是一位宽大温和的政治家，而是一个具有全能性且具有经济性格的现代政府的「巨灵」，列宁正是这个「巨灵」的化身，但他必须首先获得群众之支持。

这时的俄国不但有内忧，而且还有同德国作战的外祸。1917年7月，俄军对德军发动攻击，战况最初进展顺利，然而就在此时，德国的精锐部队投入战斗，俄国部队撤退，溃不成军。7月底前线再度胶着，但俄国已失去原有阵地，士气更为不振。

7月间彼得格勒亦遭到空前的骚扰，最初各部队抽调兵员参加总攻击，军士不满，组织示威游行，吸引海军士兵和工厂里的赤卫队也加入示威行列。游行示威的群众提出「土地、和平与面包」的要求，可是当群众失去控制的时候，连布尔什维克的鼓动者亦无法掌握，即苏维埃负责人也感到棘手，这时当一个名叫克朗士德特（Kronstadt）水兵示威时，在街头突然遭人袭击。水兵还手时也不问青红皂白，就对着街头群众和若干建筑物开火。7月16、17两日，街头死伤200人。7月18日恢复风平浪静，兵士还营，街头恢复秩序，然而司法部这时却公布一份文件，强调列宁是德国间谍，接受德国津贴，有「人证物证」。

事后经过各界的分析，所控诉之事并无确切证据；作证之人，也是来历不明令人怀疑的分子。可是大众都信以为真，于是这一纸文书也就达到预期的功效。布尔什维克的报纸《真理报》被查封，列宁恐怕被拘捕，只好潜入地下，躲在芬兰边境。

（5）冷战时代，美苏两国对于中国近代史各自建构了一套庞大谨严缜密的解释体系，美国则以费正清为首的哈佛学派为代表。所以，1968年苏联任教于列宁格勒大学的著名中国学专家贝雷茨尼（L。A。Bereznii)写了一本专著，费正清请他的一名学生摘译成英文，内部发行，在学生中流传。英文版的书名叫做Critique of American Bourgeois Historiography on China: Problems of Social Development in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries 对美国资产阶级中国学的批判：19世纪和20世纪初期的社会发展问题) 全面系统地批判哈佛学派，其矛头即指向费正清、史华兹和费的另一位大弟子，玛丽·莱特(Mary Wright)等。贝氏批判的要点超出本文范围，可参看拙作〈略论美苏两国学者对中国近代史解释的基本分歧〉，载于拙著《困学集》――X光下的美国社会，台北环宇出版社，1970年7月出版，页166－180）

（6）可参阅他的Some Polarities in Confucian Thought, 载于Arthur Wright 主编的Confucianism and Chinese Civilization，New York, 1964,页3－14。

附录：原文

(1) It is the purpose of this study to investigate the history of the Chinese Communist movement, within a limited period, in terms of its doctrinal frame of reference and of its internal political relations. It is thus not its primary purpose to consider the movement in terms of the "objective" social and political conditions which have encouraged its growth, or in terms of its effect on the masses. Nor does it deal in any detail with those elements of China"s traditional culture which may have facilitated the movement"s growth. It need hardly be added that none of these aspects can be considered in isolation from the other. One cannot, of course, understand the tensions which have developed in China between Marxist-Leninist dogma and reality, or the political relations among various groups within the party and between the party and Moscow without reference to China"s objective conditions or its cultural heritage. While bearing this fact in mind, however, we feel that we are justified in focusing our attention on an area which has been particularly neglected hitherto.

(2) We are aware that there are those who might be inclined to doubt the value of such an investigation. To those who dwell on the presumably Olympian heights of sociological, economic, geopolitical, and historic abstraction, everything which has happened in China may seem to have flowed inexorably from the "objective situation." To such people the ideological presuppositions of the leaders of the Communist movement may seem to be so much froth on the surface of reality, while the details of their political relations may seem to be so much small talk not worthy of the scholar.

(3) It would, of course, be sheer folly to deny the transcendent importance of objective conditions. All political action must be carried on with reference to the tasks imposed by the objective situation. I do, however, emphatically reject that type of animism which maintains that "situations" automatically create their own results. The manner in which the tasks are met or not met is determined quite as much by the ideas, intentions, and ambitions of those who finally assume the responsibility for meeting them, as by any other factor. The fact that in China the Communists, with their own peculiar presuppositions, have inherited the responsibility for meeting these tasks will, I think, be a factor of paramount importance in determining the shape of future objective situations.

(4) Furthermore, it is not our purpose to consider doctrine in vacuo, but to treat doctrine as molded and twisted by living men, operating in concrete situations and animated by a variety of motives. What emerges in China will certainly not be the simple result of the present doctrines and intentions of the Communist leaders. It is more likely to be the result of the tension between such doctrines and intentions and the situation in which these leaders are involved. To ignore the doctrines of the leaders, however, is to ignore one of the determining factors in this tension.

(5) Paradoxically, one of the prices often paid by those who have a supercilious disdain for ideological matters, who refuse to consider any but the "objective" factors, is a peculiar naivete with regard to ideological claims. Precisely because of their refusal to consider matters of doctrine they are often inclined to accept at face value ideological pronouncements which are simply empty ritual phrases. It is only by a study of the tension between doctrine and behavior that one can learn to distinguish between what has become dead letter and what is still living faith.

(6) It may further be objected, however, that in concentrating on the thoughts and intentions of a handful of leaders we are ignoring the      fact that what we are witnessing in China is a sweeping popular movement, an elemental upsurge of the masses, and that the leaders are merely the agents of the needs and aspirations of these masses. Now, while we are firmly convinced that the Communist movement in China has risen to power on the crest of a popular movement, this does not mean that the Communist leadership is, as it were, the mystic embodiment of the popular will, or that all its acts are the expression of the aspirations of the people. Within the Communist dispensation, in particular, there is every reason to suppose that basic historic decisions will be made by the political leaders and not by the surging masses.

（7）There are two oversimplified views to be avoided, I think, in considering the relations of the small groups of the intellectually and politically articulate to the masses in such lands as China. There is, on the one hand, the inclination to think that because these groups have come to think in a foreign idiom, they are therefore entirely cut off from the masses and have no relation to them. To those who hold such views it must be pointed out that these men cannot completely escape from the environment from which they have sprung or the situation in which they are involved, even when they look abroad for solutions.

（8) On the other hand, there is also the inclination to think that the voice of the westernized intellectual-politician in Asia is simply the voice of the masses made articulate. This view ignores the extent to which the thought of these intellectuals has been colored by their commitment to foreign philosophies as well as by their own ambitions. We would therefore suggest that, in general, the relations of these groups to the masses are not simple but paradoxical. They are involved in a common situation with the masses and yet, to a considerable extent, alienated from them.

(8－1) Applying this generalization to the Chinese Communist movement, there can be little doubt that the present Communist leaders in China have risen to power by addressing themselves to the immediate felt needs of China"s peasant millions. To leap, however, from this fact to the conclusion that they are the embodiment of the aspirations of the Chinese people and that they will automatically continue to express the needs and aspirations of the masses is to construct a myth designed to sanction in advance all their future activities. The needs of the masses hive a time dimension. Lenin may have been in complete harmony with the felt needs of the masses when he proclaimed the motto of land and peace. Was he then in harmony with their felt needs at the time of the Kronstadt uprising?

(9) As for the aspirations of the masses beyond their physical and economic needs, how can they be known unless we go into the Chinese village and live with its inhabitants? It may of course be that beyond their desire to escape from their present wretchedness the masses are simply confused about the type of life which they wish to live. Whatever may be the case, it behooves us to approach this whole question in a spirit of humble agnosticism. If by the phrase "the aspirations of the masses" we simply mean that their political leaders know what is best for them, that the leaders will succeed in making their own aspirations those of the masses, then let us say so and not indulge in sentimental rhetoric. We know that the masses wish to escape from their present wretchedness. In the absence of knowledge, however, we have no right to say that the masses of China wish to reproduce the pattern of either Detroit or Magnitogorsk in China. We are, however, in a somewhat better position to study the ambitions and aspirations of their leaders.

(10) I would therefore suggest that in China we have witnessed not only an elemental upsurge of the masses, but also the rise of a vigorous new ruling group to power. These are two related, but separate facts.

(11) To some it may appear that this study concerns itself overmuch with the hairsplitting details of the Marxist-Leninist scolastique. In the first place, it should be observed that this doctrinaire hair-splitting is the atmosphere in which the Chinese Communist leaders live and the air which they breathe. Unless we form some acquaintance with it, we cut ourselves off from an understanding of their mental world.

(12) More important, however, it is only by grappling with the details

of doctrine that we can attempt to judge what elements of doctrine are still the mainsprings of action and what elements have already become dead verbiage designed to conceal the decay of doctrine.

(13) In general, it is our view that in spite of its seeming "successes," Marxism has in its movement eastward -- into situations for which its original premises made little provision -- undergone a slow but steady process of decomposition. This process had already gone some distance with Lenin, himself, and might have gone still further if he had lived longer. Elements which are organically inseparable in the original doctrine had already been torn asunder and isolated from each other with Lenin. With Stalin, of course, this process has gone still further, and it has been one of the aims of this study to show how the process has been carried forward yet another step by the experience of the Chinese Communist Party.

(14) At every step, to be sure, the process has been inhibited and counterbalanced by a tremendous "will to orthodoxy" (closely related to the power interests of the groups involved). Whenever circumstances have finally led to a course of action not provided for by previous doctrine, every attempt is made to prove that such action was actually contemplated in advance and new rationalizations are then devised to fit new experiences into an elaborate facade designed to prove an unerring consistency and unfailing foresight. On the other hand, so long as political action seems to be in harmony with orthodox tenets, such tenets are considered inviolate and not open to question.

(15) It is the conclusion of this study that the political strategy of Mao Tse-tung was not planned in advance in Moscow, and even ran counter to tenets of orthodoxy which were still considered sacrosanct and inviolate in Moscow at the time when this strategy was first crystallized; that it was the only the force of circumstance which finally led Moscow to provide a façade of rationalization for this new experience.

(16) If this conclusion is true, what bearing does it have on the immensely complex question of the relations of the Kremlin to the Chinese Communist Party? If the Maoist strategy was not planned in advance in Moscow, if the Mao leadership was not directly chosen by Moscow, these are historic factors which must bear some weight in the consideration of this question. However, it must be emphasized that relations between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party are quite as likely to be determined by a whole range of factors operating in the present and in the future as by factors inherited from the past.

(17) On the other hand, this conclusion does bear much more directly on the enormous claims made for Marxism-Leninism as a sort of magical science enabling its self-chosen high priests in the Kremlin to plan their grandiose global strategy well in advance, allowing no room for unexpected contingency. An immense effort is currently being made by orthodox Stalinist historiography to present the Chinese Communist success as the result of Stalin"s own prescience and masterly planning. It is strange to note that this myth has been accepted and even insisted upon by many who regard themselves as the Kremlin"s bitterest foes. It is our own conviction, however, that Communist success no less than Communist failure is often un-planned in advance.

(18) To underestimate the cleverness of the Soviet leaders or their single-minded pursuit of their objectives, would be sheer folly. On the other hand, to accept their own image of themselves as super-human "social engineers" operating on the basis of an infallible historic science is equally dangerous. We should not underestimate the attractiveness of such an image to large segments of modern humanity desperately looking for straws to cling to, and we must remember that such an image has a paralytic effect on those opposing the Kremlin and discourages belief in the possibility of maneuvering against it in a world still full of incalculable contingencies.